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An Ecological Approach to Anomaly Detection: 
The EIA Model 
Pedro Pinacho , Ivan Pau , Max Chacon , and Sergio Sanchez 
Abs t r ac t . The presented work proposes a new approach for anomaly 
detection. This approach is based on changes in a population of evolving 
agents under stress. If conditions are appropriate, changes in the popula-
tion (modeled by the bioindicators) are representative of the alterations 
to the environment. This approach, based on an ecological view, im-
proves functionally traditional approaches to the detection of anomalies. 
To verify this assertion, experiments based on Network Intrussion Detec-
tion Systems are presented. The results are compared with the behaviour 
of other bioinspired approaches and machine learning techniques. 
1 Introduction 
This paper proposes an artificial immune system (AIS) based on a population 
of evolutionary agents. The model is centered on the effect of environmental 
changes or perturbat ions on highly sensitive individuals, employing the concept 
of bioindicator [15]: tha t is, the quantification of this effect on the population 
of individuals in order to detect abnormalities. Because such an environment is 
the continuous representation of the characteristics of a monitored system, the 
model must be used for the detection of anomalies in any characterizable system 
based on a a parameter flow representing its s tate. 
Anomaly detection is a solution to the problem of classification tha t consists 
of segregating objects in a set of different classes. In some cases, these classes 
are predefined and do not change over time. In more complex cases, classes may 
not be defined a priori, and may change over time. One of the more complex 
scenarios is Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS). In this realm, the 
classifying algorithm must deal with at least two fundamental classes: normal 
traffic and intrusive traffic. These classes are not static, as they change due to 
the usual variation in the behavior of system users or the presence of a new or 
unknown attack. Hence, this scenario has been chosen to test the capacities of 
the classifier proposed in this paper. 
The Artificial Indicator Species model (EIA in Spanish) proposes an ecologi-
cal approach, assuming tha t an agent population tha t plastically adapts to its 
surroundings in order to subsist will develop learning skills, which is its struc-
tural modification in this context. This ecological approach is present in Varela's 
constructivist vision on the Biological Immune System (BIS) [26], which empha-
sizes self-affirmation and homoestatic potential. This vision is the inspiration 
for Nanas [20], which implements an adaptive network of terms used for filtering 
information. Unlike the approach set forth in this paper, it is based on a network 
and not on a population of agents. 
The metaphor of the immune system has been widely used for the detection 
of intrusions in computer systems because they involve similar targets: the de-
tection and elimination of agents that are not own/harmful/destabilizing. It is 
precisely this difference of concepts that has given rise to a prolific and diverse 
set [4] of hybrid techniques collectively called Artificial Immune Systems [10]. 
All these proposals seek to rescue capacities of identification, threat elimination, 
failure tolerance and adaptability of Biological Immune Systems through a se-
ries of proposals such as Formal Immune Network (FIN) [24], which is based on 
programmed cell death and cytokine-controlled immunization (messenger pro-
teins), Clonal Selection (CLONALG), which posits a proliferation of detectors 
capable of detecting antigens and exploring them in order to enhance affinity 
by means of somatic hypermutation [5], Negative Selection (LISYS) [9] which is 
based on the maturation of T lymphocytes to produce immunological tolerance 
[12] and models based on the Jerne immune network [3]. There is evidence that 
these techniques do not deal with the change of normality in a consistent man-
ner, while they also rely on models that are partial and not fully accepted [28]. 
Moreover, Bersini also shows that approaches based on the traditional concep-
tion of the immune system as a defensive entity, which is implicit in the foregoing 
techniques are incorrect, and it is encountering ever greater opposition among 
biologists [2]. For Bersini, the real contribution of the BIS model for engineering 
lies in the concept of endogenous double plasticity [6], which holds that a system 
adjusts structurally during its functioning in a continuous and plastic manner, 
integrating new elements and discarding old ones, with the change controlled by 
its internal dynamic. This is based on simple heuristics such as compensating 
for weak elements, maintaining diversity and eliminating redundancy, that is, 
maintaining balances through ecological mechanisms, which is the foundation of 
the present paper. 
The approach in the EIA model possesses substantial operational advantages 
over the prevailing approach for developing NIDS, which is focused mainly on 
classifiers which relies on the use of recognized attack signatures or patterns, 
with the drawbacks of requiring constant updating to be useful, in addition to 
proving ineffective against unknown attacks [11]. The latter is one of the main 
points of interest in the development of AIS, which are closer to approaches 
based on the detection of anomalies. Although they do provide a solution to the 
problem of novelty attacks, they carry the drawback of being associated to a 
significant increase in false positives [7]. 
The structure of the model, its components and the functioning of the proto-
type elaborated with the multi-agent programming tool Netlogo [23] are presented 
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Fig. 1. General System Scheme 
in Section II. Section III shows the procedure for transforming agents into bioindi-
cators, and Section IV presents the adaptation of the model to be used as a clas-
sifier in the domain of information security. Section V describes the experiments 
and provides details on the algorithms used for comparison. Section VI gives the 
results, which were statistically validated with the Wilcoxon sign test [27]. Finally 
section VII sets forth the main conclusions of the paper. 
2 Model 
The general model, of which the EIA proposal is an anticipation, envisions the 
immune system as a symbolic entity that seeks to preserve or find new inter-
nal equilibria between chaos transitions generated by perturbations produced 
by attacks for this study. In this context, system learning is achieved through 
the progressive adaptation of its agents, which causes a continuous structural 
modification of the agent population by means of natural selection and the use 
of a mutation operator. Immunity is understood, in this scheme, as a cognitive 
system, owing to its recognition, learning and memory abilities [26]. 
The system model is structurally described in equation 1, where FADS is for 
Flow Anomaly Detection System, T, T is a bidimensional topology inhabited by 
a set of evolutionary agents, A is the set of agents and X is a set of particles con-
sumed by agents and determined by the medium where the agents are inserted: 
that is, the system must be monitored. 
FADS=(T,A,X) (1) 
Figure 1, shows a schematic view of the general operation of the EIA model, 
which has the following stages: 
— Guest Characteristic Capture (A): In the first phase, the system hears a 
continuous characteristics flow which represents the operation of the system 
under analysis. 
< ^ 
— Model Characteristic Input (B): Subsequently, the characteristic flow is pre-
processed, yielding observable characteristics in the same binary form a G X, 
which are inputted in topology T of the model. 
— Agent Exposure (C): Adaptive agents (3 G A are exposed to elements of X, 
causing an increase or decrease of their energy, and with this strenghening, 
their reproduction or death. 
— Population Impact (D): When observable characteristics (a) impact on 
agents, they generate effects that can be measured at a population level 
through two variables of interest: population size and average energy of the 
agent population, which are the basis for the developed classifier. 
2.1 Artificial Bioindicators 
The EIA model has been created with the multiagent programming tool Netlogo. 
Agents / J e i are created, initially, with a random genetic configuration, with 
the expectation that the fittest will survive and generate decendents. Each agent 
has a structure (3 = (TT, 9, A), where n C II is the set of rules that determines 
the conduct of the agent /3, 9 corresponds to the genetic value of the agent and 
A = (p, tp) determines the agent's position in the topology T, given by p, and 
the current energy of the same, as given by tp. 
Reproduction of agents is asexual and uses a mutation operator that acts 
on the vector described in Equation 2, carrying out a permutation between two 
elements of the vector. The importance of the genetic vector is that it determines 
the affinity of each agent with the environment. This affinity is constituted by a 
gene for each particle a of the existing n. 
Q = {{9o,9i,---,9n)\^9k,9i ((k +3) => (9k ^ 9j)} (2) 
When a impacts an agent, it becomes either food or poison, depending on the 
expression shown in Equation 3, which determines its nutritional value (NV). 
Where i is the index of gen gj. which represents particle o^ that has impacted the 
agent, </> represents the maximum nutrition that can be provided by a particle a 
and e is a parameter that determines a linear nutritional loss applied owing to 
a lack of affinity with particle a. 
NV = 4>-ie (3) 
Agents (3 are governed by the set of rules (TT) described in Table 1, where (1) 
specifies that agents must achieve a minimum level of energy established by 
ReproductionQualityOf Li f e (RQL) in order to generate descendants, in (2) it 
is specified that agents, when losing all their energy due to poisoning - that 
is, owing to a lack of affinity with particles a in circulation - are eliminated; 
in (3) agents have a baseline energy consumption determined by the variable 
metabolism and in (4) agents are fed by all the particles impacting on them. 
Table 1. EI A World Rules 
Agents behavior rules (TT) 
(1) (agent(j3) A energyMoreThan(/3,RQL)) 
=> birth(j3 ) . 
(2) (agent(/3) A energy Exhausted(f3)) =>• kill(/3). 
(3) agent(/3) =>• energy Reduce(f3, Metabolism). 
(4) (agent(/3) A particle(a) A colision(f3, a)) =>• eat(/3, a). 
World physics rules (to) 
(i) observedParameter(x) =>• insert(ax) 
(ii) (particle(a) A outOfRange(a)) =£- remoue(a) 
(m) (particle(a) A exhausted(a)) =£- remoue(a) 
(iv) particle(a) =£- LeftMove(a) 
2.2 T o p o l o g y and Part ic les 
EI A corresponds to a model of artificial life tha t possesses a set of simple physical 
rules tha t regulate the behavior of particles a in the topology T. 
The EI A topology T = (E, fi), is composed of E, to which all the cells in the 
topology belong, and by the world rules fi, described in Table 1. The topology 
of the presented model is linear. Other topologies will be evaluated in future 
works. As observed in Figure 2, the topology corresponds to a 32x16 bidimen-
sional grid. The rule (i) allows for the input of new particles in the topology 
when the corresponding characteristic has been observed in the network traffic 
being monitored; the rule (ii) eliminates a particle of the model when it outputs 
from the topology; rule (Hi) eliminates particles tha t are exhausted due to the 
consumption caused by the collision with the agents and rule (iv) is the rule of 
movement which carries all the particles inserted in a random rightward position 
in the column (initial position) towards the left. This movement occurs once for 
each particle a from synchronic iteration of the model 
3 Model Sensitization 
The structures discussed and the rules on the basis of which they act in EIA con-
st i tute a system comprised of an agent population tha t adapts to the normality 
of a supervised system. It would be of interest to observe the population reacting 
in a sensitive and quantifiable manner to disorders caused by abnormalities in the 
observed system. Hence, the parameters in the model were adjusted and agents 
were made highly sensitive to these disorders, thus becoming bioindicators. 
The flow generation function was used to yield a sequence of variations in the 
input vectors, thus testing each of the parameters of the model in order to find 
values tha t would lend greater sensitivity to the agent population. Tested values 
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in EIA parameters correspond to a variation in values that sensitize agents pre-
viously found in an experimental manner. This procedure increased the general 
sensitivity to flow variations of the EIA model from an average of 35% to 62% 
in the tests performed. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the agent population, following the adjust-
ment of these parameters, from their creation to their exposure to an attack. At 
moment 0, an initial population of 300 agents is created with random genetic 
vectors. These agents are exposed to habitual network traffic, thus leading to 
an adjustment consisting of the death of unfit agents and a reduction of the 
population to fewer than 50 individuals. Subsequently, the most fit agents pro-
liferate and generate descendance by mutation. Until iteration 5570, there is an 
increase and stabilization of the agent population with an incidence of fractal 
noise that is intrinsic to ecological systems [19]. In iteration 5570, a probe attack 
with Satan1 occurs, causing a significant fall in the size of the population, that 
is, a quantifiable deviation in one of the model's variables of interest, which is 
the basis for using the model as a classifier. 
4 The Classifier 
Once the agent population is sensitized to any perturbations in the environment 
(achieved through adjustments in model parameters), attention must center on 
change in the emerging structure established: that is, on the repercussions of 
environmental changes on the population level. This is achieved by means of 
monitoring the aforementioned variables of interest. 
The variables of interest population size and average population energy exhibit 
noise in their behavior. Hence, a measurement of their trends for use as discrim-
inators should be considered, and such variables are therefore transformed into 
classifiers through the incorporation of sliding windows and thresholds with the 
following parameters: 
1
 SATAN (Security Administrator Tool for Analyzing Networks). 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of Agents Population 
agents number upper and lower limits for agents number 
upper and lower limits for average energy of agents 
Fig. 4. sliding windows working on Netlogo 
Table 2. Detected Characteristics 
Detected Characteristics (a) 
IP reserved bits, MF, DF, Urg, Ack, Reset, Syn, Fin, Telnet, 
SSH, FTP, Netbios, rlogin, RPC, NFS, Lockd, NetbiosWinNET, 
Xwin, DNS, LDAP, SMTP, POP, IMAP, HTTP, SSL, px, Serv, 
Time, TFTP, NNTP, NTP, lpd, Syslog, SNMP, bgp, Socks 
— Length of sliding windows: This parameter sets the number of past values 
used in calculating the current average of the variables of interest. This 
corresponds to the point of reference used by higher and lower tolerange 
ranges, which may be observed in Figure 4. 
— Tolerance bandwidths: Determines the distance of the bands accompanying 
the variable of interest. If the variable of interest exceeds the upper or lower 
limit owing to more iterations than those established in the classifer alarm 
threshold, an intrusion alarm is declared. 
— Classifer alarm threshold: Sets the maximum successive iterations the vari-
ables of interest can exceed a tolerance range without triggering an alarm. 
These parameters are adjusted in accordance with the domain of computer se-
curity, particularly the development of NIDS systems. These systems can be 
understood as classifiers capable of detecting an at tack based on an analysis of 
network traffic, where this traffic is a continuous flow of data that is captured 
with sniffing techniques, that is, the capture of all accessible network traffic at 
the point of connection In this scenario, the flow characterizing the system under 
study (i.e., the monitored network) is used to feed the agent population in the 
EIA model package by package, based on information from the transmission and 
network layers of the TCP/IP stack. This is achieved by transforming through 
pre-processing forty characteristics of network traffic specified in Table 2, thus 
allowing the incorporation of their representations in the EIA model by means 
of particles (a). 
The data for running this calibration process were extracted from different 
sources: samples of normal traffic were obtained from the network of the De-
partment of Information Technology of the University of Santiago de Chile, 
while the security tools NMAP and Nessus were used to generate hostile traf-
fic. Specifically, these tools generated probe and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, 
respectively. 
Probe, according to DARPA [18] are related to remote reconnaissance activi-
ties carried out by intruders prior to an attack, while DoS attacks consist of any 
activity aimed at preventing the delivery of a computer service. From this point 
of view, any attack on the availability of a system falls in this latter category. 
Selection of classifier parameters posited a classifer based on the variable of 
interest agent population size, a second based on the average energy of the 
population and, finally, a unifying classifier based on the best parameters of the 
two first classifiers, but recalibrating the alarm threshold. The adjustment was 
made with the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves (ROC) technique [8]. 
To identify the best classifier, a comparison was made of areas under the ROC 
curves (AUC). These areas have values between 0.5 and 1, where 1 represents a 
perfect classification and 0.5 signifies complete discriminatory incapacity. Exper-
iments with the results observable in Figure 5, determined that the area under 
the curve (AUC) of the unified classifer (0,8149) is greater than both that based 
on population size (0,7860) and that based on average energy (0.7664). Hence, 
it is selected for the execution of comparative tests based on traffic for a stan-
dardized benchmark. The best classifier parameters found may be observed in 
Table 3. Because the algorithm is non-deterministic, all tests were performed 10 
times, with curves generated by means of Bezier approximations. 
Table 3. Classifier Parameters 
Parameter Value 
Length of sliding window (Agents) 900 
Tolerance bandwidth (Agentes) 2 
Length of sliding window (Energy) 2800 
Tolerance bandwidth (Energy) 0 
Joint alarm threshold 200 
Fig. 5. Receiver Operating Characteristic Curves for all Classifiers 
5 Experiments 
The experiments specified in this section were posited to verify that a classi-
fier based on notions of ecological systems can attain operational advantages 
over other automatic learning systems in the classification problem in intrusion 
detection systems by adaptating to changes in normal conditions and detecting 
innovative attacks. Comparisons were made with other bio-inspired classification 
techniques used successfully to develop NIDS, and such techniques were used to 
verify skill in detecting known and unknown threats. 
5.1 Experiment Data 
Tests of the EIA model and classifiers in comparison were performed with the 
widely used DARPA'98 data set. Use was discounted of KDD'99 data, which are 
considered to be of questionable validity and usefulness [21] , and also poor for 
the evaluation of anomaly detector systems [25]. 
5.2 Algorithms Evaluated 
The classifier based on the EIA model was subjected to comparative tests to 
three other classifiers based on biological metaphors as described below: 
— Artificial Neural Network (ANN): Use of a multilayer perceptron is being 
considered owing to its good results in the implementation of intrusion de-
tection systems [16]. The network was trained with backpropagation and 
Levenbeg-Marquard because these reduce the number of false positives [17]. 
The quantity of neurons in the hidden layer was calculated according to [22] 
and then adjusted in a calibration process, leading to assignment of 16 neu-
rons in the hidden layer based on an correctness criterion, with the use of 
54 input characteristics from the TCP/IP package headings. 
— Formal Immune Network (FIN): This proposal of immunocomputing (IC), 
like the neural network, can be considered to fall within the field of computa-
tional intelligence. FIN proposes the generation of a Euclidean multidimen-
sional space (FIN space) in which a training process based on application of 
a discrete tree transform (DTT) [1] and/or a singular value descomposition 
(SVD) [13] incorporates input data and its initial space, which is optimized 
to form a set of class representatives for representation called cytokines, 
following a process of apoptosis and immunization explained in [24]. These 
cytokines operate according to a proximity principle in the FIN space to 
determine the class of data reviewed when mapped in the space with the 
DTT algorithm. 
— Modified Formal Immune Network (FIN+): The test was conducted against 
a modified version of FIN (FIN+) developed for this comparation. By in-
corporating the concept of time and uncertainty, it generates temporary 
groupings, detecting regions of space with quick growth for classification as 
attacks, thus improving performance against unknown attacks of the original 
algorithm. 
5.3 Design of Experiments 
To evaluate the behavior of classifiers in changing scenarios and in detection 
of new/unknown attacks. Described algorithms are measured and compared in 
terms of false positives (FP) or type I errors and correctness determined by 
Equation 4, where (TP) represents True Positives and (TN) represents True 
Negatives. The results were statistically validated with the Wilcoxon sign test. 
Correctness = (4) 
n 
The tests were divided into two groups: known attacks and unknown attacks. 
Tests with known attacks were executed by subjecting the classifiers ANN, FIN 
and FIN+ to training that includes the attacks to which they will be exposed. 
Further, the unknown attack group is based on attacks not included in the 
training sets of classifier algorithms: this distinction does not apply to the EIA-
based algorithm because the latter is not trained with attacks, but only exposed 
to normal traffic of 3000 packets, a time that has been empirically shown to be 
sufficient for their adaptation or the stabilization of the agent population. 
6 Results 
Table 4 shows the average FP values and the correctness achieved by the classifier 
algorithms for tests with known and unknown attacks. It may be observed in 
the table that for known attacks, EIA (15.56%) yields fewer false positives than 
other classifiers, with the closest being the modified version of the Tarakanov-
Iturbe algorithm (FIN+), with 23.38%, a significant difference (p < 0.05). For 
the same type of attacks, EIA achieves better average correctness than the three 
Table 4. Main Results 
Known Attacks Unknown Attacks 
Classifier FP Correctness FP Correctness 
EIA 0.1556 0.7848 0.1556 0.7848 
FIN 0.26 0.7017 0.2923 0.6756 
FIN+ 0.2538 0.6728 0.2762 0.6798 
ANN 0.3097 0.6670 0.3477 0.6284 
classifiers with which it is compared; but it achieves a significant advantage with 
ANN and FIN (p < 0.05), although not with FIN+, of which it does not deliver 
a significant distance. 
In the unknown attacks scenario, EIA (15.56%) yields significantly better 
results in terms of false positives than the other three classifiers (p < 0.05)), 
with the closest being the result of FIN+ (27.62%). The same result repeats 
in the results of average correctness marks, where EIA attains 78.48% against 
FIN+ (67.98%), thus attaining a result that is better than the other three by 
p < 0.05. The EIA model achieves a specificity of 86%, sensitivity of 95%, and 
precision of 86%. 
6.1 Other Tests of EIA 
The EIA classifier was subjected to further tests to check the consistency of the 
results, as the non-deterministic algorithm means that the results may differ 
from one experiment to another. Verification was perform by means of tests on 
characteristic attacks of each of the categories in the DARPA '98 set, which are: 
DoS, R2L, U2R and Probe. Where R2L (Remote to Local) refers to a category of 
attacks in which the intruder seeks to gain access to a computer system remotely 
and U2R (User to Root) refers to an unauthorized attempt to increase privileges. 
In Table 5 it may be observed that EIA consistently detects practically all 
test series in DoS, R2L and probe attacks, whereas it cannot detect U2R attacks 
as easily, as it successfully did so in only half the experiments. This result is 
consistent with the general behavior of EIA, where it more easily detected DoS 
and Probe attacks. This is explained by the fact that variables based on the 
EIA agent population possess a certain inertia owing to the use of a sliding 
window and it reacts more readily to more extensive perturbations such as those 
caused by port scanning or flood attacks in the categories of Probe and DoS, 
respectively. 
In terms of attacks, EIA detected in the first instance 35 of 47 attacks in the 
DARPA'98 set (74%). Review of undetected attacks revealed that none had suf-
ficient length to activate the classifier because the parameter adjustment based 
on the ROC curve indicated that the best value of the classifier alarm threshold 
is 200. Thus, if the attack is not part of a packet trace (with normal background 
traffic) that is longer than 200, it does not trigger an alarm in the classifier. This 
Table 5. Classifier Consistency 
Category Attack Detections 
DoS Neptune 99/100 
R2L Diet 99/100 
U2R FFB 50/100 
Probe SATAN 100/100 
may be related to the fact that the ROC calibration was performed with probe 
and DoS attacks of a moderate length. In later tests, in which the length of 
attacks was determined arbitrarily in order to complete at least the 200 packets 
necessary to sensitize the model, 11 of 12 attacks were detected. It should be 
noted that non-detection of these attacks in the tests did not significantly affect 
the comparative results owing to their minor presence in packet terms in the 
test data set of DARPA' 98. 
7 Conclusions 
This article provides a report on the proof of concept of a new " Flow Anomaly 
Detection System" (FADS) in development. The article includes the results of a 
set of experiments to show the features of the proposal and its applicability. 
The analysis of the results verifies that it is feasible the creation of a pop-
ulation of evolutionary agents sensitive to environmental conditions that when 
subjected to stress can act as a classifier. In this way it is shown that these 
systems coincide with the biological evidence that the system's sensitivity to en-
vironmental changes increases when the genetic diversity of the species (agents) 
decreases. 
When subjected to a complex problem of classification, the model developed 
has advantages over other bioinspired techniques traditionally used in the prob-
lem of intrusion detection network. The most important advantage obtained is 
the reduction of false positives where the technique of artificial indicator species 
(EIA) improves the results of three common indicators of both known and un-
known attacks. The proposal has also shown competitive in terms of accuracy 
when attacks are known and even better than the other techniques when the 
attacks are unknown. 
The classifier based on EIA proposes that learning by continuous adaptation 
has advantages over the machine learning techniques tested (FIN and ANN). 
Additionally it is shown that can outperform an algorithm with capabilities of 
online learning such as FIN+. 
EIA is the first step in the project of developing a homeostatic control system. 
The main goal of the homeostatic control system is not to have separate stages of 
training and production but a unique dynamic and continuing stage to stabilize 
the host system where it is inserted, facilitating the maintenance of the whole 
system. 
The use of bioindicators respond to partial advance of the system, which 
tackles the sensing and adjustment of the population of agents. In this context, 
it is necessary to obtain readings of the population changes, useful model to 
re turn to the current inability of the agents car modified their environment. 
For this reason, the next steps of this project oriented to allow the changes 
impacting the population of agents into the environment through a continuing 
dialogue achieved through its structural coupling [14]. 
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